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In view of malicious insider attacks on cloud computing environments, a new Context-
Aware Access Control Model for cloud computing (CAACM) was presented. According to the 
characteristic of cloud computing, we take spatial state, temporal state and platform trust 
level as context. The model establishes mechanisms of authorization from cloud management 
role to objects, which enables dynamic activation of role permission by associating cloud 
management role with context. It also achieves fine-grained access control on cloud objects 
by supervising the permission of management role in full life cycle. Moreover, it introduces 
the concept of exclusive managerial role, which extends access control from static protection 
on  resources  to  dynamic  authorization  on  managerial  roles.  Further,  it  describes  the 
approach of role permission activation systematically. CAACM formally proves to be safe 
and it lays the groundwork for the deployment of CAACM in cloud computing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
As  the  extension  of  multiple  computing  modes  such  as  parallel  computing, 
distributed computing and utility computing, cloud computing provides convenient and 
low-cost computing services. However, it also brings new security challenges [1]. The 
users of computing services should concern not only the cost of data storage but also 
the security and privacy of managed data. Malicious insider, one of seven threats of 
cloud computing has become the most serious problem and caused wide public concern 
in recent years [2]. 
In  existing  platforms  of  cloud  computing,  traditional  distributed  access  control 
models are still used [3]. However, there is a notable difference between the mode of 
cloud computing and traditional data storage. In cloud computing, both the backup and 
migration  of  managed  data  are  performed  by  managers,  and  the  user  can  access  to 
computing services only using the provided interfaces. Because of this mode, malicious 
insiders can steal confidential data easily through privileged operations [4]. 
Access control, the selective restriction of access to data or other resource, is always 
a major problem in computer security. Currently, the access control models fall into 
three types: MAC (Mandatory Access Control),  DAC (Discretionary Access Control) 
and RBAC (Role-Based Access Control). In comparison, RBAC has emerged as a key 
solution for the threat of malicious insiders, since it simplifies authority management by 
separating users with permissions logically [5]. 
For large systems with complex relations between a large number of roles, Sandhu et 
al.,  proposed  a  model  named  ARBAC97  [6],  which  extended  RBAC  model  with International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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manage  role  and  the  corresponding  licensing  strategy.  ARBAC97  improves  the 
manageability of systems, but it doesn’t constrain the permissions of management roles. 
In API level of cloud computing, Sirisha  et al., proposed a two-phase access control 
mechanism based on RBAC model [7]. However, it is incompatible with the openness 
of cloud computing since only accesses from  white-list users are allowed.  Li et  al., 
proposed model S-RBAC [8] to perform access control on SaaS mode, but they didn’t 
consider the temporal constraints on permission license. Based on behavior definition 
[9],  Lin  et  al.,  proposed  access  control  model  CCACSM  [10]  for  cloud  computing. 
CCACSM combines BLP model with Biba model to achieve high confidentiality and 
integrity. Unfortunately, it doesn’t take Malicious Insider into account as well. 
Currently,  most  of  existing  access  control  models  protect  resources  from  system 
perspective.  Once  a  subject  gains  access  to  an  object,  it  will  be  able  to  use  the 
permission in its full-life cycle. In this case, the models are not able to dynamically 
adjust  distributed  permissions  according  to  environment  information  (e.g.,  time, 
location and platform). It’s obvious that such management style might very well lead to 
losses  as  it  offends  the  principle  of  least  privilege.  In  recent  years,  more  and  more 
researchers  have  realized  the  importance  of  context  in  authorization.  Many  context-
sensitive access control model have been proposed, such as GTRBAC[11], X-GRBAC 
[12],  GRBAC  [13],  GEO-RBAC  [14]  and  SC-RBAC  [15].  For  different  application 
scenarios,  these  models  enhance  the  description  power  of  authority  policies  by 
extending roles with time and location, which improves the security and flexibility of 
cloud  computing  significantly.  However,  the  managers  of  cloud  computing  should 
manage system resources through specific platform (software, hardware and so on). If 
the platform is tampered maliciously, the security of cloud computing will still not be 
guaranteed even the temporal and spatial factors of managers are constrained [16]. 
To perform access control on malicious insiders of cloud computing, we introduce 
the notion of context by synthesizing multiple aspects of security information, such as 
temporal  state,  spatial  state  and  trust  level  of  platform.  On  this  basis,  we  proposed 
CAACM,  a  novel  Context-Aware  Access  Control  Model  for  cloud  computing.  The 
advantages of CAACM are the following: 1) it dynamically constrains the permissions 
of manager roles in full-life cycle by associating roles with context, and achieves fine-
grained access control from  managers to objects.  2)  It  follows the principle  of  duty 
segregation by extending static protection on resources to dynamic authority protection 
on manager roles, and thus guarantees the security of sensitive system operations. 3) It 
follows  the  principle  of  least  privilege  by  using  a  novel  method  of  role  permission 
activation, and thus improves the credibility of system. Moreover, we formally prove 




2.1. Fundamental Conceptions 
To  illustrate  the  principle  of  CAACM,  we  first  present  several  fundamental 
Conceptions as follows. 
Trust Level of Platform. It indicates how credible the platform seem to the users of 
cloud  computing.  Generally,  the  trust  levels  of  cloud  computing  platform  can  be 
grouped  into  three  classes:  public,  secret  and  top-secret  [17].  The  permission  of  a 
manager role is different when the role accesses resources on different platforms. For International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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example, the manager can only access public resources on public platforms, while it can 
configure the whole system on top-secret platforms.   
Spatial State. The location set of all entities in cloud computing. Location can be of 
two types [18]: hierarchic location (topological description, such as room number) and 
coordinate location (description in Descartes’ style, such as GPS). We select the former 
as it is more suitable to describe spatial relation. Actually, the permission of a role is 
different  when  the  role  accesses  resources  at  different  locations.  For  instance,  the 
manager of a branch company has system privileges in the branch, while it is only a 
general user in controlling corporation. More details about location detection of entities 
can be found in prior work [15].   
Temporal  State.  The  set  of  temporal  constraints.  The  temporal  information  of 
management  role  can  be  divided  with  different  granularity  according  to  security 
requirements. For example, the time can be divided into business hours and commuting 
hours. The manager can access system resources during business hours. However, the 
manager’s permission will be canceled if it login during commuting hours. Moreover, 
business  hours  can  be  further  divided  into  general  business  hours  and  confidential 
business hours. The manager can access public resources during general business hours, 
while it should operate sensitive information during confidential business hours. 
Definition 1. (Context). The context c is defined as a 3-tuple (f, g, t) , where: 
  f denotes the trust level of platform. 
  g denotes the spatial state. 
  t denotes the temporal state. 
For the convenience of explanation, we further define (f, g, t) FGT, where F is 
the set of trust levels of platforms,  G is the set of spatial states and  T is the set of 
temporal states. 
Definition  2.  (Manager  role  of  cloud  computing).  The  manager  role  of  cloud 
computing car is defined as a 2-tuple (ar, c), where: 
  ar denotes the manager role. 
  c denotes the context of ar. 
Analogously, we define carCAR=(ARC), where AR is the set of manager roles, C 
is the set of Contexts. In order to follow the principle of duty segregation, we further 
give the definition of exclusive manager role by introducing the conception of exclusive 
context. 
Definition  3. (Mutually  exclusive  context). Two  contexts are  mutually exclusive 
context (abbreviated as ELC), if there is no manager belonging to these contexts. 
Definition 4. (Mutually exclusive manager role). Two manager roles are mutually 
exclusive  during  authorization  or  operation,  if  the  members  of  one  manager  role  is 
disjoint with the members of another manager role. The mutually exclusive manager 
roles during authorization and operation are denoted as SERa and SERr separately. If the 
roles  are  mutually exclusive during authorization and operation  simultaneously, they 
can be denoted as SER. 
 International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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2.2. Formal Definition 
Based  on  the  model  of  ARBA97,  CAACM  associates  manager  role  of  cloud 
computing  with  context  and  achieves  fine-grained  access  control  from  manager  to 
objects.  The  structure  of  proposed  model  CAACM  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  The 
shading  indicates  the  additional  extension  of  CAACM.  The  formal  definition  of 
CAACM is presented as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of CAACM 
Definition 5. (CAACM). CAACM is defined as a multi-tuple (U, R, S, OP, O, CAR, 
AOP, UAA, PAA, CARH, ARC, AUC, CSSoD, CDSoD), where: 
  User set U, role set R, session set S, operation set OP, object set O and permission 
set P are consist with the definition of ARBA97. 
  CAR,  AOP  and  CAP  denotes  the  set  of  manage  roles,  manage  operations  and 
manage permissions, where CARR=, CAP=2
AOPO and CAPP=. 
  UAAUCAR denotes the role assignment of users. 
  PAACAPCAR denotes the permission assignment of manage roles. 
  CARHCARCAR  is  a  partially  ordered  set  over  CAR,  which  indicates  the 
hierarchy of manager roles. Given trust levels of platform fi and fj, fi is the sub-
level of fj (denoted by fi fj) if {pi}{pj}, where pi and pj are the permissions of a 
role derived from fi and fj separately with the same spatial state and temporal state. 
Analogously,  gigj  and  titj  indicate  similar  meanings.  Given  cari  =(ri,  (pi,  gi, International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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ti))and carj(rj, (fj, gj, tj)), (cari , carj) CARH if and only if rirj, fifj, gigj and titj. 
For simplicity, we denote (cari , carj) CARH as caricarj. 
  ARC:ARN, cardinality constraints on manager roles, maps a manager role to a 
number.  It describes the  maximum number of  managers that  can  be assigned to 
manager roles. 
  AUC:CN, cardinality constraints on context,  maps an instance of context to a 
number. It describes the maximum number of managers user the instance of context. 
  CSSoD(2
SERaN). CSSoD is the set of 2-tuple (rs, n), where rs represents a set of 
mutually  exclusive  manager  role  and  n  represents  a  number  not  less  than  2.  It 
describe the maximum number of managers that can be assigned to the roles in the 
set,  which  can  be  formally  defined  as  (rs,  n)CSSoD,  trs:  |t|n  rt 
AuthorizedUser(r)=.  CSSoD  avoid  permission  conflicts  at  the  same  time  by 
perform restrictions. 
  CDSoD(2
SERrN). CDSoD is the set of 2-tuple (rs, n), where rs represents a set of 
mutually  exclusive  manager  role  and  n  represents  a  number  not  less  than  2.  It 
describe the maximum number of managers that can activate manager roles, which 
can  be  formally  defined  as  (rs,  n)CDSoD,  sS,  tSessionRoles(s)rs: 
|t|n rt AuthorizedUser(r)=. CSSoD is used to avoid conflicts during the 
permission activation of session managers. 
Compared to ARBA97, the advantages of CAACM are the following: 1) it achieves 
fine-grained access control from managers to objects by associating manager roles with 
context. 2) It guarantees multi-level security by including hierarchy of manager roles. 3) 
It  enhances  the  security  of  cloud  computing  system  by  introducing  cardinality 
constraints on manager roles and context. 4) It achieves management security during 
authorization  and  operation  by  supporting  static  duty  segregation  and  dynamic  duty 
segregation. 
 
2.3. Access Control Policies 
The security of CAACM depends on the completeness of security policies. Gavrila et 
al., [19] have proposed twenty security policies in RBAC. Unfortunately, these policies 
are still insufficient since they have not taken context and role activation into account. 
According  to  the  security  requirements  of  cloud  computing,  CAACM  should  further 
support following six policies: 
P1. The number of authorized manage users for manage roles should not exceed the 
cardinality of that role. Formally: 
carCAR, |AuthorizedUser(car)|ARC(car) 
P2.  The  number  of  authorized  managers  under  an  instance  of  context  should  not 
exceed the cardinality of that instance. Formally: 
uU, sS, carCAR, cCuSessionUser(s)(car, 
c)SessionRoles(s)uAuthorizedUser(car)Contains(c, GetContext(u)AUC(c) 
P3.  Two  manager  roles  should  not  be  assigned  to  the  same  manager  is  they  are 
mutually exclusive during authorization. Formally: International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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uU, seri, serjSERseriserjuAuthorizedUser(seri) 
uAuthorizedUser(serj)(seri, serj)SERa 
P4. Two manager roles are mutually exclusive during authorization, if and only if the 
contexts of their authorization are mutually exclusive. Two manager roles are mutually 
exclusive during operation, if and only if the contexts of their operation are mutually 
exclusive. Formally: 
cari, carjCAR, c1, c2C((cari, c1), (carj, c2)) SERa (cari, carj)SERa(c1, 
c2)ELC 
cari, carjCAR, c1, c2C((cari, c1), (carj,c2))SERr  (cari, carj)SERr(c1, 
c2)ELC 
P5.  Two  manager roles are  not  mutually  exclusive if they are active in the  same 
session. Formally: 
seri,serjSER,sSseriserj(c1,c2CseriEffectiveSessionRoles(s, 
c1)serjEffectiveSessionRoles(s, c2)) (seri serj)SERr 
P6. The context of access request should fall within the prescribed limits. Formally: 
sS,cC(carCAR,cEffectiveSessionRoles(s,c)) 
The  first  two  policies  constrain  the  number  of  managers  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
information leakage. Based on P3, P4 and P5, it is apparent that mutually exclusive 
manager  role  is  the  base  of  management  duty  segregation.  P6  achieves  dynamic 
permission management by constraining the context of manager roles. 
 
2.4. Access Control Mechanism 
CAACM is a dynamic access control model depending on time, location and platform 
environment. It assigns permission licenses according to above mentioned policies. The 
access control of CAACM on managers has three phases: permission assignment, role 
activation and dynamic authorization. 
2.4.1.  Permission  assignment:  There  are  two  aspects  to  permission  assignment: 
assigning manager roles to users and assigning permissions to manager roles. 
Definition  6.  (Manager  role  assignment  function).  Manager  role  assignment 
function is  defined as  AssignedCar: UCR2
CAR, a  mapping from users to  manager 
roles. CR is the set of prerequisites that the role assignment should satisfy. For example, 
if  the  prerequisite  cr  is  true  for  a  given  user  u,  then 
AssignedCar(u)={carCAR|crCR(u, car)UAA} 
Definition 7. (Permission assignment function). Permission assignment function is 
defined as AssignedCap: CARCP2
CAP, a mapping from users to permissions. CP is 
the  set  of  prerequisites  that  the  permission  assignment  should  satisfy,  e.g., 
AssignedCap(car)={capCAP |cpCP(cap, car)PAA} if the prerequisite cr is true 
for a given manager role car.  
2.4.2.  Role  activation:  In  CAACM,  the  manager  role  integrated  with  context  is 
essentially dynamic. Users do not have to select the role for activation directly. The 
roles will be configured as active or inactive automatically according to context. Firstly 
we present the definition of user mapping function and manager role mapping function. International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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Definition  8.  (User  mapping  function).  User  mapping  function  is  defined  as 
SessionUser: SU, a mapping from a session to a user. In the life cycle of a session si, 
the user SessionUser(si) is invariable.  
Definition 9. (Manager role mapping function). User mapping function is defined 
as  SessionRoles:  S2
CAR,  a  mapping  from  a  session  to  manager  roles. 
SessionRoles(si)⊆{(car,  c)CAR|(SessionUser(si),(car,  c))UAA},  SessionRoles(si) 
indicates the set of activable manager roles in session si.   
CAACM evaluates the relationship between mutually exclusive context and current 
context to determine the effective session role. The definition of valid session role are 
described as follows: 
Definition  10.  (Effective  session  role).  Effective  session  role  is  defined  as 
EffectiveSessionRoles: SC→2
CAR, where EffectiveSessionRoles(s, ci)={(r, cj)CAR|(r, 
cj)SessionRoles(s)cicj)=True} 
CAACM select the validate session roles according to the context of manager. An 
role r is an effective session role, if r is an session role in context ci and ci is contained 
in the context of a manager. 
2.4.3. Dynamic Authorization: Effective session role is the basis of making decisions 
on access requests. An access request can be defined as a 4-tuple (s, c, aop, o) which 
denotes manager of session s in context c try to perform operation aop on an object o. 
The following is the definition of authorization function. 
Definition  11.  (Authorization  function).  An  access  request  aar  (s,  c,  aop,  o) 
SCAOPO, is authorized in context c if : 
   
  , 
,
car EffectiveSessionRoles s c




For a received access request, CAACM get the current context of manager  c and 
permit  the  access  if  an  session  manager  is  in  context  c  and  (aop, o)  is  included  in 
validate set of role authorization. 
 
2.5. Security Proof 
The operations of manager on user data and the state transition in CAACM can be 
proved to be security, if all system states in the model are ensured to be safe. In other 
words, the correctness of CAACM is proved. The following definitions are essential to 
describe the relation of state transition. 
Definition 12. (Current access set). Curernt access set AARSCAOPO are the 
set of operations which are performed by current session manager in current context. 
Definition 13. (System State). System state of CAACM v can be defined as (AAR, U, 
S,  O,  CAR,  AOP,  UAA,  PAA,  CARH,  ARC,  AUC,  CSSoD,  CDSoD).  For  simplicity, 
system state can be abbreviated as (AAR, OTHERS). V is defined as the set of all system 
states. 
Definition 14. (Policy decision set). Policy decision set D= {“yes”, “no”, “error”, 
“?”} includes all the possible decisions of CAACM on access requests. “yes” means the International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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request is authorized,  while “no” means the request is rejected. “error” denotes that 
some unknown error is occured. “?” means CAACM is not able to handle the request. 
Definition 15. (Relation of state transition). Given a rule set ω={ρ1, …, ρs}. For 
any request rkRE, dmD, set of system state V, subsequent set of system state V′, the 
relation of state transition W(ω)REDVV′ is defined as: 
(1) (rk, dm, V, V′)W(ω), if and only if dm“?” and dm“error”. 
(2) There is an unique i(1is) such that (dm, V′)=ρi(rk, V). 
Definition 16. (CAACM system). CAACM system is defined as a 4-tuple (RE, D, 
W, z0)XYZ, where RE is the set of manager requests, D is the policy decision set, W 
is the relation of state transition and z0 is the initial state. X is defined as the set of all 
possible request sequence. Y is defined  
Definition 17. (Security state). System state vV is a security state if v meet the six 
policies of access control.  
According  to  above  definitions,  input  x  produces  the  subsequent  state  of  policy 
decision y and state z from the initial state z0 RE, D, W, z0) includes all 
the execution sequence from state V0. State sequence {z1, z2, …, zi, …} is a secure state 
sequence if zi is secure state for all i. Each element (x, y, z RE, D, W, z0) is 
considered as a system profile. A system profile (x, y, z) is secure if z is a secure state 
sequence. On this basis, the definition of secure system is presented as follows. 
Definition 18. (Secure system). System (RE, D, W, z0) is a secure system if initial 
state z0 is secure and each profile (x, y, z)(RE, D, W, z0) is secure profile. 
LEMMA 1: (RE, D, W, z0) is a secure system, if initial state z0 is secure and the 
following conditions are true for any relation of state transition (Ri, Dj, (AAR, OTHER), 
(AAR′, OTHER′)): 
(1) Any subsequent operation that transforms the system state is in line  with the six 
access control policies. That is, if (s, c, aop, o)AAR′AAR, it will be consistent 
with these policies. 
(2) Any request operation that is inconsistent with the six policies is not included in the 
set of subsequent operations. 
Proof: Given an arbitrary (x, y, z) (RE, D, W, z0), zt=(AARt, OTHERt) for every t. 
Assume (x1, y1, z1, z0) W. First of all, we should prove that z1 is secure if z0 is 
secure. Then, we will conclude that CAACM system is secure by induction. 
Apparently,  AAR1=(AAR1AAR0)(AAR1AAR0)  and 
(AAR1AAR0)(AAR1AAR0)=. 
Assume  (s,  c,  aop,  o)AAR1,  then  (s,  c,  aop,  o)(AAR1AAR0)  or  (s,  c,  aop, 
o)(AAR1AAR0). 
Further assume (s, c, aop, o)(AAR1AAR0), then it is consistent with the six access 
control policies according to condition (1). 
Given AAR
*={(s, c, op, o)|(s, c, op, o) is not consistent with the six policies, it is 
obvious that (AAR
*AAR1)= according to condition (2). International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
Vol.6, No.6 (2013) 
 
 




*AAR1)AAR0  =,when  AAR
*
  belongs  to 
AAR1AAR0. 
Thus, (s, c, aop, o)AAR
* if (s, c, aop, o)(AAR1AAR0). Based on the above two 
cases, it is proved that z1 is a security state since (s, c, aop, o) should be consistent with 
the six policies. 
Moreover, zt is proved to be secure by induction on Nt. we can conclude that system 
profile (x, y, z) is a secure profile. Because of the arbitrariness of (x, y, z), (RE, D, W, 
z0) must be a secure system. Here this lemma is proved. 
THEOREM 1: The CAACM system is secure. 
Proof: The initial state of CAACM system is secure, and all subsequent operations 
are consistent with the six access control policies.  According to LEMMA 1, we can 
conclude that the CAACM system is secure. 
 
3. Application of CAACM 
CAACM is suitable for outsource-oriented systems, especially for the systems based 
on cloud computing. In a company of cloud computing, there are: 1) system managers 
who manage the authorization of access control, 2) business managers who manage all 
system  resources,  3)  normal  users  who  access  public  resources  and  their  private 
resources.  To  ensure  the  user  privacy  and  data  security,  the  company  has  strict 
regulations. A system manager and a business manager should operate on secret and 
top-secret platforms respectively. Furthermore, they should operate during office hours 
and in their own office rooms. 
In order to derive the spatial and temporal information of staffs, the company issues 
every staff with RFID tag and installs RFID reader at the entrance of every office. All 
manage platforms in the company has internal TPM and a integrity measurement system 
based on TCG architecture [20]. The CAACM system will record spatial and temporal 
information of a manager when he (or she) enter or leave a room by RFID verification. 
Moreover, the system will measure the trust level of manage platform and construct the 
manager context when the manager login the platform. 
The above-mentioned application shows that R={SM, BM, NU} and AR={SM, BM}, 
where SM is the set of system managers, BM is the set of business managers, NU is the 
set of normal users. The system context C= {SC, BC, NC}, where SC is the context of 
all system managers, BC is the context of all business managers, NC is the context of all 
normal users. The constructed manager roles of cloud computing are the following: (SM, 
SC), (SM, NC), (BM, BC), (BM, NC), (NU, NC).  
The authorization processes of system managers and business managers are similar. 
Assume business manager A create session s1 in context c1. If c1 is included in BC, the 
manager role (BM, BC) is effective in session s1. If A create session s1 in other context, 
(BM, BC) will be the only effective manage role of A and have the same permission as 
normal users. 
Considering the disclosure risk, CAACM carries out constraints on the numbers of 
manager  roles  and  managers:  ARARC  and  CAUC.  To  defend  against  collusion 
attacks from managers, CAACM also demands that a staff should not act as a system 
manager  and  a  business  manager  simultaneously.  In  other  words,  it  carries  out 
constraints  of  static  duty  segregation:  ((SM,  SC),  (BM,  BC))CSSoD.  Moreover, 
CAACM demands that a business manager should not login in the context of a normal International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
Vol.6, No.6 (2013), pp.1-12 
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user to protect trade secrets of the company. In other words, it carries out constraints of 
dynamic  duty  segregation:  ((BM,  BC),  (BM,  NC))CDSoD.  In  summary,  these 
constraints ensure that managers can only access specific system resources at a specific 
time and location. 
 
4. Model Comparison 
In order to reflect the advantages of CAACM, we compare it with  existing models of 
access  control  in  the  following  aspects:  1)  whether  context-awareness  (including  time, 
location and platform trust level) is supported, 2) whether cloud computing is supported and 
3) whether the solution of malicious insider problem is supported. The results are shown in 
Table  1,  where  “”  means  supported,  “”  means  unsupported  and  “〇”  means  partially 
supported. 
Table 1. Comparison between CAACM and Existing Models 
 
 
Table  1  shows  that  ARBAC97,  CAB-RBAC  and  S-RBAC  are  not  suitable  for  cloud 
computing since they cannot restrict the spatial state, temporal state and platform trust level 
of managers. Although GTRBAC and X-GTRBAC are more flexible by analyzing temporal 
constraints, they still do not support constraints on location and trust level. SCA-RBAC, 
GEO-RBAC, SG-RBAC and ABAC involves the conception of role location, but they do not 
take platform trust level into account and ignore the dependence of access control on role 
location. Moreover, CCACSM in [10] performs access control only on  normal users and 
ignores the risks from malicious insiders. Generally, these models are carried out without 
consideration for the characteristics of cloud computing and their application is restricted. By 
comparison, CAACM not only involves constraints on context including time, location and 
platform trust level, but also achieves fine-grained access control on managers. Thus, it will 
be widely applied in cloud computing. 
 International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing 
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5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Permission management is a key security problem of cloud computing.  In view of the 
characteristics and demands of cloud computing on manager access control, a Context-Aware 
Access Control Model based on ARBAC97 for cloud computing (CAACM) was proposed. 
The model not only inherits the advantages of ARBAC97, but also protect the privacy and 
data security of users by adding context and manager roles. Moreover, we formally prove the 
security of CAACM to ensure that malicious insiders are not able to compromise the data 
security of users. 
As  an  access  control  model,  CAACM  is  worthy  of  further  study.  One  of  greatest 
challenges is how to ensure the integrity of CAACM platform. The trust level of platform will 
lose its credibility if the integrity is broken. How to monitor the integrity of platform in full-
life cycle is a hot issue for our further research. Credibility measurement is another challenge 
for CAACM system.  It is usually a time-consuming task with high redundancy since cloud 
computing  system  contains  a  great  number  of  VMs.  How  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
credibility measurement is also an important research topic. 
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